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Since the beginning of our nation’s history, the line dividing federal 
and state power has been debated.  The federal courts, however, have 
determined the placement of that boundary line. Originally, federal 
judges were chosen by the President with the consent of a Senate, which 
was chosen by legislatures of the States. Today, federal judges are still 
chosen by the President with the consent of the Senate, but the Senate is 
no longer chosen by the State legislatures.  As a result of this 
constitutional change, which proponents wrongly argued would not 
affect state sovereignty, the States lost an important say over the make-
up of the federal judiciary that the framers intended for them to have. 
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Winston Churchill praised the “rigidity of the Constitution of the 
United States” as “the shield of the common man.”1  In truth, our 
Constitution has not changed, except through amendment.  In practice, 
however, each of the three branches of the federal government has 
exceeded its delegated constitutional authority, often to the detriment of 
state sovereignty.2 
The framers intended for one of the three federal branches—the 
judiciary—to especially serve as a hedge against federal expansion 
beyond the authority of the Constitution.  In the Federalist No. 78, for 
example, Alexander Hamilton wrote that the federal courts would serve 
as the “bulwarks of a limited constitution against legislative 
encroachments.”  During the Pennsylvania ratification convention, 
James Wilson remarked that the judiciary’s “duty” was to “pronounce [] 
void” acts of the federal legislature that “transgress[ed] the bounds” of 
the Constitution.  Accordingly, “under this Constitution, the legislature 
may be restrained, and kept within its prescribed bounds, by the 
interposition of the judicial department.”3 
It was not long after ratification of the Constitution, however, that it 
became apparent that the federal courts would tend, not toward restraint 
of federal power as the framers intended, but instead toward expansion.4  
This trend has since continued. 
Absent fundamental change in the make-up or direction of the 
federal judiciary, federal expansion is certain to continue.  The Senate, 
of course, has oversight over selection of the federal bench.  Originally, 
1. Winston Churchill, What Good’s A Constitution? (1936). 
2. See generally Steven T. Voigt, Two Early Events that Can Help Us Better Understand 
the Commerce Clause, 30 J.L. & Pol. 16 (2015) (“the true scope of federal authority, particularly 
under the commerce clause, is much narrower than its modern application.”); Steven T. Voigt, The 
Divergence of Modern Jurisprudence from the Original Intent for Federalist and Tenth Amendment 
Limitations on the Treaty Power, 12 U.N.H. L. REV. 85, 105 (2014) (“The presumption has been for 
a long time to justify big government somehow, some way, rather than to place the onus on the 
federal government to prove to the people and the states that the power it claims to have it actually 
holds.”); Steven T. Voigt, The General Welfare Clause: An Exploration of Original Intent and 
Constitutional Limits Pertaining to the Rapidly Expanding Federal Budget, 43 CREIGHTON L. REV. 
543, 543 (2010) (“If today’s federal government actually tried to justify the federal budget under the 
Constitution, the argument could not be based on the enumerated powers of the Constitution 
because the scope of federal spending reaches far beyond those enumerated powers.”). 
3. James Wilson, Remarks in the Pennsylvania Convention, in 1 COLLECTED WORKS OF
JAMES WILSON 203-04 (Liberty Fund, Inc. 2007). 
4. For example, in 1821, Thomas Jefferson wrote that the federal judiciary was “working 
like gravity by night and by day, gaining a little today and a little tomorrow, and advancing its 
noiseless step like a thief over the field of jurisdiction until all shall be usurped from the States and 
the government be consolidated into one. To this I am opposed.”  Letter from Thomas Jefferson to 
Charles Hammond (1821), available at http://www.thefederalistpapers.org/founders/
jefferson/thomas-jefferson-danger-from-a-powerful-central-government 
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under Article I Section 3, the Constitution provided that Senators would 
be chosen by the legislatures of the States.  The Seventeenth 
Amendment, ratified in 1913, changed this and provided for the direct 
election of Senators by the people.  After this amendment, regardless 
whether they elected to do so, States no longer had even the opportunity 
to select Senators who pledged to protect state sovereignty using the 
Senate’s oversight of the federal bench. 
One possibility that would give States more say over the selection 
of federal judges is a constitutional amendment conferring upon each 
State the power of consent over each federal judicial appointment within 
the jurisdiction of that State. This, in turn, would allow States more 
active participation in selecting those federal judges who will ultimately 
decide the placement of power between federal and state authority.  Such 
an amendment, by no means is an answer to all constitutional excess. 
Such an amendment, however, would likely have both populist and state 
appeal, and would also lay the groundwork for moving application of the 
Constitution back to the framer’s intent. 
I. FROM THE START, THE COURTS EXPANDED FEDERAL POWER 
During the Constitutional Convention, framer John Dickinson, 
advocating for a Congress elected in part by the people and in part by the 
legislatures of the States, stated, “Let our Government be like that of the 
solar System; let the General Government be the Sun and the States the 
Planets repelled yet attracted, and the whole moving regularly and 
harmoniously in their respective Orbits.”5  Dickinson argued that a 
Congress arising from the two sources would encourage a well-
functioning government.  Unfortunately, it was not long before 
Dickinson’s metaphor began to topple and federal power grew while 
state sovereignty shrunk.6 
Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, and other framers were deeply 
troubled by the early Supreme Court’s tendency toward broadly 
interpreting federal authority under the Constitution.  Jefferson wrote in 
1820 that of the three branches of the federal government, “we have 
most to fear” from the judiciary.  He argued vividly that the judiciary “is 
5. John Dickinson, as quoted in WILLIAM MURCHISON, THE COST OF LIBERTY, THE LIFE OF
JOHN DICKINSON 192 (ISI Books 2013); see also 1 ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE 
CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 399 (1876). 
6. See generally RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION 1 (Princeton 
University Press 2004) (“The Constitution that was actually enacted and formally amended creates 
islands of government powers in a sea of liberty.  The judicially redacted constitution creates islands 
of liberty rights in a sea of governmental powers.”). 
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the subtle corps of sappers and miners constantly working under ground 
to undermine the foundations of our confederated republic.  They are 
construing the constitution from a co-ordination of a general and special 
government to a general and supreme one alone.”7 
Likewise, in 1823 in a letter to Justice William Johnson, Jefferson 
wrote that “The States supposed that by their tenth amendment, they had 
secured themselves against constructive powers.”  But, he said, the 
States were not “aware of the slipperiness of the eels of the law.”  Even 
though the “States can best govern our home concerns, and the General 
Government our foreign ones,” Jefferson worried that the judiciary 
would erode the “distribution of powers established by the constitution” 
and “all offices” would be “transferred to Washington, where, further 
withdrawn from the eyes of the people, they may more secretly be 
bought and sold as at market.”8 
Madison similarly wrote in 1800 that judicial interference with the 
relationships of “the rights of the parties to the constitutional compact” 
would “annul the authority delegating” the judiciary’s powers and 
threaten to “subvert forever” the Constitution.9  In 1819, Madison wrote 
that while it “was foreseen at the birth of the Constitution” that 
“differences of opinion might occasionally arise in expounding terms & 
phrases” in the Constitution, “especially those which divide legislation 
between the General & local Governments,” “few if any of the friends of 
the Constitution” anticipated that the judiciary would use the overly 
“broad” and “pliant” construction that was in fact taken by the 
judiciary.10  He warned against “expounding” the Constitution “with a 
laxity” that “may vary its essential character, and encroach on the local 
sovereignties with [which] it was meant to be reconcilable.”11 
II. THE IMPORTANCE OF STATE SOVEREIGNTY TO THE FRAMERS
Our government is one of checks, balances, and separation of 
power.  The people delegated certain powers to the States. Acting 
through their citizenship in the separate States, the people granted other 
7. Thomas Jefferson’s Letter to Thomas Ritchie (Dec. 25, 1820) in JEFFERSON WRITINGS 
1446 (The Library of America 1984). 
8. Thomas Jefferson’s Letter to Justice William Johnson, June 23, 1823 in JEFFERSON
WRITINGS 1476 (The Library of America 1984)  
9. James Madison, On the Alien and Sedition Acts (1800), in MADISON WRITINGS 614 (The 
Library of America 1999). 
10. James Madison Letter to Spencer Roane (Sept. 2, 1819) in MADISON WRITINGS 735 (The 
Library of America 1999). 
11. Id. at 736. 
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powers to the three branches of the federal government at the respective 
State ratifying conventions.  Other authority remains to this day 
undelegated and rests with the people.  Other authority—natural rights—
can never be justly delegated.  As among the people, the States, and the 
federal government, any increase in power held by one necessarily 
results in a decrease in power of the others. 
The States have always held a crucial role in our governance.  This 
is apparent from many sources, including the role of the States in 
ratification of the Constitution and the discussion of the proposed 
Constitution at the ratifying conventions and elsewhere, as well as other 
writings of the founding fathers. 
A. The Role of the States During Ratification 
Despite the phrase “We the People” in its preamble, the 
Constitution was not ratified by a nationwide popular vote.  Instead, it 
was submitted for ratification to conventions of the States, as stated in 
Article VII: “The Ratification of the Conventions of nine States, shall be 
sufficient for the Establishment of this Constitution between the States 
so ratifying the Same.”  Thus, the States did not legislatively ratify the 
Constitution.  Rather, the States acted by the expressed will of their 
citizens at the ratifying conventions. 
The Constitutional Convention of 1787 resolved that the proposed 
Constitution should “be laid before the United States in Congress 
assembled” and “afterwards be submitted to a Convention of Delegates, 
chosen in each State by the people thereof, under Recommendation of its 
Legislature, for their Assent and Ratification.”12  In a letter to Congress 
on the same day, the Convention wrote, “That [the proposed 
Constitution] will meet the full and entire approbation of every State is 
not perhaps to be expected.”13 
Nor does “We the People” in the preamble eliminate the 
significance of the States in ratification, particularly considering the 
history of this phrase.  On August 6, 1787, during the Constitutional 
Convention, the Committee of Detail circulated a draft of the 
Constitution that opened with “We, the people of the states” and 
enumerated the thirteen States.14  The draft began: 
12. Resolutions of the Convention Concerning the Ratification and Implementation of the
Constitution (Sept. 17, 1787) in DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION PART ONE 967 (The Library of 
America 1993). 
13. Letter from the Constitutional Convention to the President of Congress (Sept. 17, 1787)
in DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION PART ONE 966 (The Library of America 1993). 
14. 2 GEORGE BANCROFT, HISTORY OF THE FORMATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
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We, the people of the states of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode 
Island and Providence Plantations, Connecticut, New York, New Jer-
sey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, 
South Carolina, and Georgia, do ordain, declare, and establish, the fol-
lowing Constitution for the government of ourselves and our posteri-
ty:— 
ARTICLE I.  The style of this government shall be “The United States 
of America.”15 
On August 7, 1787, the Convention agreed to this form of the 
preamble in the Constitution.16  Toward the end of the convention, the 
draft (with this preamble) was sent to the five-member Committee of 
Style for the “finish given to the style and arrangement of the 
Constitution.”17  William Johnson, Alexander Hamilton, Gouvernour 
Morris, James Madison, and Rufus King sat on the Committee of Style. 
Morris is recognized as penning the final version of the Constitution 
with its final stylist revisions.18  Among the changes Morris made was to 
revise the beginning of the preamble to the form we know today—”We 
the people of the United States.”19  Morris omitted the names of the 
thirteen States because the Constitution would go into effect only after it 
was ratified by nine of the States and it was not known at the time which 
States would ratify it.20  On September 12, 1787, the Committee of Style 
reported the preamble to the convention in its revised form.21 
James Madison, the “father of the Constitution,” wrote that “all” of 
the “discussions” over ratification of the Constitution “justified and 
recommended” it on the basis “that the powers not given to the [federal] 
government, were withheld from it”, and because “the Constitution was 
submitted to the ‘States’” and “the ‘States’ ratified it”, “they are 
consequently parties to the compact from which the powers of the 
Federal Government result.”22  In the Federalist No. 39, Madison wrote 
that assent and ratification of the Constitution was to be given by the 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 119 (D. Appleton and Co. 1889).  
15. WILLIAM M. MEIGS, THE GROWTH OF THE CONSTITUTION IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 
OF 1787 32 (J.B. Lippincott Co. 1900). 
16. Id. 
17. MELANIE RANDOLPH MILLER, AN INCAUTIOUS MAN, THE LIFE OF GOUVERNEUR 
MORRIS 79 (ISI Books 2008) (quoting Madison) (emphasis in original). 
18. Bancroft supra note 15, at 207.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 208. 
21. MEIGS, supra note 16. 
22. James Madison, Report on the Alien and Sedition Acts in MADISON WRITINGS 610 (The
Library of America 1999). 
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people, “not as individuals composing one entire nation; but as 
composing the distinct and independent States to which they 
respectively belong.  It is to be the assent and ratification of the several 
States, derived from the supreme authority in each State, the authority of 
the people themselves.”  Likewise, in his essay published under the pen-
name “Alfredus,” Samuel Tenny of New Hampshire penned: “The 
Constitution now before the public is not a compact between individuals, 
but between several sovereign and independent political societies 
already formed and organized.”23 
When the Constitution reached the State ratification conventions, a 
number of representatives objected to the phraseology of the preamble, 
arguing either that it exceeded the authority of the convention or that it 
could be misunderstood to designate larger power to the federal 
government than truly existed.  In Virginia’s ratifying convention, for 
example, Patrick Henry demanded to know what right the framers had to 
say “We, the people” instead of “We, the states.”24  In North Carolina’s 
ratifying convention, Mr. Caldwell argued that “We the people” was 
improper if it meant “the people at large.”25  Those objections continued 
after ratification.  In 1823, for example, John Taylor of Caroline, 
Virginia, in his treatise New Views of the Constitution of the United 
States, argued that the federal government is derived from the States.26 
Not surprisingly, notable correspondence during the time of the 
ratifying conventions typically referred to States or conventions of States 
as ratifying the Constitution (not to the people as a whole): “the general 
convention of the state of Delaware has unanimously ratified the new 
constitution”,27 “Connecticut has adopted the constitution”,28 and “The 
state of New Hampshire have this moment adopted the federal 
constitution . . . .”29 
23. Samuel Tenny, “Alfredus,” in FRIENDS OF THE CONSTITUTION, WRITINGS OF THE
“OTHER” FEDERALISTS, 1787-1788 252 (Colleen A. Sheehan & Gary L.McDowell eds., 1998). 
24. 1 ALBERT J. BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL, 375 (Houghton Mifflin Co.
1916). 
25. JONATHAN ELLIOT, THE DEBATE IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 15 (1876). 
26. JOHN TAYLOR, NEW VIEWS OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 184 (Way
and Gideon 1823). 
27. LETTER OF OTTO TO MONTOMORIN (Dec. 15, 1787), reprinted in 2 GEORGE BANCROFT,
HISTORY OF THE FORMATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  454 (D. 
Appleton and Co. 1889).   
28. LETTER OF KNOX TO WASHINGTON (Jan. 14, 1788), reprinted in 2 GEORGE BANCROFT,
HISTORY OF THE FORMATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  455 (D. 
Appleton and Co. 1889).   
29. LETTER OF JOHN LANGDON TO RUFUS KING (June 21, 1788), reprinted in 2 GEORGE
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Ultimately, after the Constitution was ratified, the Tenth 
Amendment followed soon thereafter and reiterated that all powers not 
delegated to the federal government were left with the States or with the 
people.  Certainly, the States, even with the advent of the union, were 
intended to continue to have a vital role in governance of our nation.  As 
James Iredell, a Justice of the Supreme Court in the 1790s, wrote: “A 
State does not owe its origin to the government of the United States, in 
the highest or any of its branches.  It was in existence before it.”30  And 
“[b]y a State forming a republic I do not mean the Legislature of the 
State, the executive of the State, or the judiciary, but all the citizens 
which compose that State and are . . . integral parts of it.”31 
B. The Constitution was Ratified Based on the Understanding that the 
States held Greater Power 
One could assemble volumes compiling the founding fathers’ 
statements that the States retained more powers than the federal 
government.  Briefly, however, a few examples follow. 
In the Federalist No. 32, Alexander Hamilton wrote, “But as the 
plan of the Convention aims only at partial Union or consolidation, the 
State Governments would clearly retain all the rights of sovereignty 
which they before had and which were not by that act exclusively 
delegated to the United States.”32  In the Federalist No. 45, Madison 
wrote: 
The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the Federal 
Government, are few and defined.  Those which are to remain in the 
State Governments are numerous and indefinite.  The former will be 
exercised principally on external objects . . . The powers reserved to 
the several States will extend to all the objects, which, in the ordinary 
course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties and properties of the peo-
ple; and the internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the State.33 
Roger Sherman penned: “The powers vested in the federal 
government are clearly defined, so that each state still retain its 
sovereignty in what concerns its own internal government, and a right to 
BANCROFT, HISTORY OF THE FORMATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA 471 (D. Appleton and Co. 1889).   
30. HENRY CONNOR, JAMES IREDELL LAWYER, STATESMAN, JUDGE 36 (1912) (quoting
Chisolm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793)).  
31. Id. at 43 (quoting Penhallow v. Doane’s Adm’rs, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 54 (1795)).
32. THE FEDERALIST NO. 32 (Alexander Hamilton) (emphasis in original). 
33. THE FEDERALIST NO. 45 (James Madison). 
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exercise every power of a sovereign state not particularly delegated to 
the government of the United States.”34  Justice Joseph Story wrote that 
the Constitution is “an instrument of limited and enumerated powers, it 
follows irresistibly, that what is not conferred, is withheld, and belongs 
to the state authorities, if invested by their constitutions of government 
respectively in them; and if not so invested, it is retained BY THE 
PEOPLE, as a part of their residuary sovereignty.”35  Noah Webster 
wrote: 
The constitution defines the powers of Congress; and every power not 
expressly delegated to that body, remains in the several state-
legislatures.  The sovereignty and the republican form of government 
of each state is guaranteed by the constitution; and the bounds of juris-
diction between the federal and respective state governments, are 
marked with precision.36 
And in Pennsylvania’s ratifying convention, James Wilson argued that 
the “true line” separating federal and state power would not be difficult 
to ascertain because the federal powers are “enumerated” and “well 
defined.”37 
III. THE ORIGINAL SENATE, CHOSEN BY THE STATES
The States as a whole initially had means to ensure that their power 
was preserved in the courts: the Senate.  While members of the House of 
Representatives were elected by the people directly,38 members of the 
Senate were originally appointed by the legislatures of the States. 
Consequently, the Senate had the potential to serve as a powerful check 
against federal encroachment into the authority of the States. 
Article I Section 3 provided that the Senators from each State 
would be “chosen by the Legislature thereof.”  Because the legislatures 
of the States selected Senators, the States had a direct say in federal 
34. Roger Sherman, “A Citizen of New Haven,” in FRIENDS OF THE CONSTITUTION, 
WRITINGS OF THE “OTHER” FEDERALISTS, 1787-1788 267 (Colleen A. Sheehan & Gary L. 
McDowell eds., 1998).  
35. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES: WITH A 
PRELIMINARY REVIEW OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE COLONIES AND STATES, BEFORE 
THE ADOPTION OF THE CONSTITUTION 712 (1833). 
36. Noah Webster, An Examination into the Leading Principles of the Federal Constitution 
(Oct. 1787). 
37. James Wilson, Remarks in Pennsylvania Convention, in 1 COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES 
WILSON 238 (Liberty Fund, Inc. 2007). 
38. U.S. CONST. art. I §2 (“The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members
chosen every second Year by the People of the several States . . . .”). 
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legislation and other federal authority.  The framers intended this. 
During the constitutional convention, George Mason remarked that “the 
Senate did not represent the people, but [rather] the States, in their 
political character.”39  Madison and Hamilton also commented on the 
importance of the States’ representation in the federal government 
through the Senate.  In the Federalist No. 39, Madison wrote, “The 
Senate . . . will derive its powers from the States, as political and co-
equal societies; and these will be represented on the principle of equality 
in the Senate, as they now are in the existing Congress.”  In the 
Federalist No. 76, Hamilton wrote that the “concurrence” of the Senate 
“would be an excellent check upon a spirit of favoritism in the President, 
and would tend greatly to preventing the appointment of unfit characters 
from State prejudice, from family connection, from personal attachment, 
or from a view to popularity.” 
In 1913, the Constitution was amended to provide for the direct 
election of Senators.  During debates over the Seventeenth Amendment 
in Congress, Representative Mondell said “No disturbance of the 
balance of sovereignty and jurisdiction between the States and the 
Federal Government is involved . . . .”40  He was wrong.  Once the 
States lost representation in the federal government through the Senate, 
they lost significant authority in the federal government, including any 
ability to have a say over the composition of the judiciary. 
Notably, the framers rejected direct elections of Senators by the 
people.  At the Constitutional Convention, James Wilson proposed that 
the people elect the Senate, but the proposal failed.41  Thereafter, the 
convention unanimously voted in favor of John Dickinson’s alternate 
proposal that the State legislatures elect the Senate.42 
The line between federal and state power is still being debated in 
the courts and today, as throughout our nation’s history, the federal 
judiciary more often than not sides with federal expansion.  The trend is 
not surprising.43 The legal maxim, boni judicis est ampliare 
39. 3 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, PURCHASED BY ORDER OF CONGRESS; BEING HIS
CORRESPONDENCE AND REPORTS OF THE DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 1306 (Henry D. 
Gilpin ed., 1840) (emphasis in original). 
40. 48 Cong. Rec. 6355 (1912). 
41. WILLIAM MURCHISON, THE COST OF LIBERTY, THE LIFE OF JOHN DICKINSON 192 (ISI
Books 2013). 
42. Id. 
43. JOHN TAYLOR, NEW VIEWS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 292 (Way
and Gideon 1823) (“In establishing the division of powers between the federal and state 
governments, another principle as important, and not less true than that of uniting sympathy with 
power, was kept in view by the convention, namely, that great power is a great temptation to do 
wrong.”). 
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jurisdictionem (meaning “a good judge will enlarge his jurisdiction”) is 
at work.  Jefferson cited this phrase when criticizing the early federal 
court, arguing that the federal judiciary intended to “lay all things at” the 
“feet” of the federal government.44 
Without a State-controlled Senate ensuring that States have a say in 
the make-up of the federal judiciary, an important mechanism to 
maintain the careful balance of federal and state power is gone.  The 
States and the federal government are akin to two professional sports 
teams where the coaches on one team select all of the referees.  The 
States no longer have a say over who umpires the game.45 
IV. THE ADVICE AND CONSENT AMENDMENT
While some commentators and politicians have called for the repeal 
of the Seventeenth Amendment, doing so does not appear imminently 
likely.46  At least in terms of checks and balances related to the federal 
judiciary, there is another way to create a hedge against federal 
expansion into state sovereignty. 
An amendment requiring a State’s consent for the appointment of 
the judges who will decide issues related to that State’s sovereignty is 
fair.  Let us take any State as an example.  Call it State X.  Right now, 
State X has no say over the judges who will determine critical issues 
related to State X’s sovereignty.  State X does not choose its Senators. 
With the consent of the majority of the Senators of the States,47 none of 
whom are chosen by the legislatures of any of the States, the President 
44. Thomas Jefferson’s Letter to Thomas Ritchie (Dec. 25, 1820), in JEFFERSON WRITINGS
1446 (The Library of America 1984). 
45. Notably, the United States fought for its independence based partly on foreign control of
the judiciary.  See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776) (The King of England “has 
made Judges dependent on his Will alone . . .”); see also John Dickinson, Letter from a 
Pennsylvania Farmer No. 9 (“the time may come, when we may have to contend with the designs of 
the crown, and of a mighty kingdom. What then must be our chance, when the laws of life and death 
are to be spoken by judges totally dependent on that crown, and that kingdom.”).  Granted, British 
control over the colonial judiciary is a much different scenario than the judiciary today.  But in this 
matter it is worth remembering the grievances of our founding fathers, see generally Steven T. 
Voigt, The International Criminal Court’s Antagonism to the United States Constitution and Our 
Need to Articulate an Alternative, in THE NUREMBERG WAR CRIMES TRIAL AND ITS POLICY
CONSEQUENCES TODAY 164 (Beth A. Griech-Polelle ed., Nomos 2009), and considering that today 
the people have little practical influence over the appointment of the particular judges of the federal 
bench.  With state approval of judges, however, State representatives—who each have a finite set of 
constituents—would serve as better conduits for the people to express their voice during the process 
of deliberating over the arbiters of the law.  
46. See AMENDMENT XVII ESTABLISHING ELECTION TO THE U.S. SENATE 21 (Jeff Hay ed.,
Greenhaven Press 2010) (referencing a recent, unsuccessful call for repeal). 
47. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2. 
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determines who will decide these issues for State X.  The Senators from 
States A, B, and C have the same voting power (one vote for each 
Senator) as do the two Senators from State X, assuming the Senators 
from State X are even concerned about the sovereignty of State X. 
Jefferson’s maxim—boni judicis est ampliare jurisdictionem—suggests 
otherwise: that federal Senators will choose to expand federal power. 
But if State X’s legislature had a veto over the State’s federal 
judges, then it would not matter as much which political party is in 
Washington D.C. and what the inclinations of the Senators from States 
A, B, and C, and so on, happen to be.  Or whether the Senators from 
State X care about the State’s sovereignty.  State X’s legislature would 
have the ability to block judges who might tip the balance of power too 
far in favor of Washington D.C., at least with regard to State X.  And 
Washington D.C. could refrain from nominating judges who might tip 
the balance too far the other way.  The result, while certainly not 
guaranteed to be perfect, might nevertheless more favorably result in 
neutral referees who would protect the concept of federalism and ensure 
that the boundaries of the Constitution are not artificially expanded. 
This is the mold of a federal judge as envisioned by the framers. 
The amendment would have a populist appeal.  Individual voters 
would have more input into the appointment of federal judges by 
communicating with their local State representatives, who have fewer 
constituents than do Senators and who are more attuned to local 
sentiments, issues, and naturally, with fewer constituents, to individual 
feedback.  The people of each State would also know that the people of 
their State, rather than the people of the forty-nine other States, had a 
real voice over the judges who would decide the issues applicable to 
their State.  Thus, the amendment would give more power to the people. 
It also should appeal to States.  The States would have their say over 
judges whose decisions directly affect them, and ideally the joint system 
would better select “bulwarks of a limited constitution.”48 
As for the Supreme Court, approval by at least two-thirds of the 
States would safeguard the important voice of the States while avoiding 
the likely impracticability of unanimity.  The more extended consent 
process that would unfold in the States would allow for better vetting of 
the nominated justice as each State took the time to consider the merits 
of the President’s selection. 
The possible text of such an amendment follows: 
Amendment XXVIII 
48. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton). 
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Section 1.  Federal appellate court judges, district judges, and 
magistrate judges shall be nominated by the President and thereafter 
appointed by the President only with the advice and consent of the 
legislatures of the States wherein the judges have jurisdiction. 
Section 2.  Supreme Court Justices shall be nominated by the 
President and thereafter appointed by the President only with the advice 
and consent of at least two-thirds of the legislatures of the States. 
V. CONCLUSION 
An amendment giving power to the States to approve federal judges 
is not a panacea for federal expansion beyond the authority of the 
Constitution, but it would give States a greater say in who decides the 
placement of the line that divides federal and state power.  The States 
have, for the most part, been losing the tug-of-war with Washington 
D.C. since the beginning of our republic.  And, absent change, our 
nation will likely continue down this course.  Two hundred years ago, 
Thomas Jefferson warned that consolidation of power would lead to 
catastrophe.  Then, he asked rhetorically, would “a single State of the 
Union . . . have agreed to the constitution, had it given all powers to the 
General Government?”49  It is past time to start considering workable 
solutions to get our nation back within the confining authority of our 
governing document, the Constitution of the United States of America. 
49. Thomas Jefferson’s Letter to Justice William Johnson (June 23, 1823), in JEFFERSON 
WRITINGS 1472 (The Library of America 1984). 
